Showing 1 - 10 of 22
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of power relations and strategic investment in the transport system for Russian gas. First, we analyse how the architecture of the transport system determines Russia’s bargaining power vis-à-vis (potential) transit countries. By applying the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011497648
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003513704
We use cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream’s strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859364
We use cooperative game theory to analyze the strategic impact of three controversial pipeline projects. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream’s strategic value turns out to be huge, justifying the high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549204
We use cooperative game theory to analyze the strategic impact of three controversial pipeline projects. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream's strategic value turns out to be huge, justifying the high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345502
We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271079
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of power relations and strategic investment in the transport system for Russian gas. First, we analyse how the architecture of the transport system determines Russia's bargaining power vis-à-vis (potential) transit countries. By applying the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273372
We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline network determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system, the main transit countries, Belarus and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490463
We use cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream's strategic value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500225
We use cooperative game theory to analyze the strategic impact of three controversial pipeline projects. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream's strategic value turns out to be huge, justifying the high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374346