AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...

AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform GameBargaining Power Biform GamesBiform Games and ExternalitiesSome Examples from the Recent LiteratureBrandenburger and Stuart (2007)Chatain and Zemsky (2007)Biform Games and Job MatchingA...

AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions

AbstractThe following sections are included:Bargaining Power GamesExamplesThe Relation of this Model to Some PredecessorsMatching Games and Bargaining PowerBargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function FormReflectionsSummary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Shapley's “Algorithm”Maskin's ProposalAn Extended Shapley AlgorithmSome ExamplesAn Illustrative ExampleA Game with Strong Positive ExternalitiesA Game with Mild Positive ExternalitiesA Game that is not SuperadditiveThe Enigma GameAn Exceptional...

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Primer for Cooperative Games in Extensive FormFurther ExamplesAn Example with Demographic ChangeA More General DiscussionChapter Summary and Conclusions

AbstractThe following sections are included:Superadditive Games in Coalition Function FormThe CoreShapley ValueThe NucleolusA Comparative PerspectiveChapter Summary