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Coalition formation in a global warming game : how design of protocols affects the sucess of environmental treaty-making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - In: Natural resource modeling : the official journal of the … 19 (2006) 3, pp. 323-358

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003376176

Heterogeneity of countries in negotiations of international environmental agreements : a joint discussion of the Buchner-Carraro, Eyckmans-Finus, and Chander-Tulkens chapters

Thoron, Sylvie - In: The design of climate policy, (pp. 187-198). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662401

Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001910304

Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making

Eyckmans, Johan - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409262

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game : How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2013

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299