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Collusion in bertrand vs. cournot competition : a virtual bargaining approach
Melkonyan, Tigran A.; Zeitoun, Hossam; Chater, Nick - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 64 (2018) 12, pp. 5599-5609
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011964553
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A refined bargaining set of an n-person game and endogenous coalition formation
Zhou, Lin - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000828072
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Alternative approaches to analyze the role of beliefs in strategic interaction
Sander, Philipp; Hauenschild, Nils; Ziems, Danny - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635731
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Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models
Renou, Ludovic - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 36 (2008) 3, pp. 407-433
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003729488
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A theory of coalition bargaining
Breitmoser, Yves (contributor) - 2006
When voting takes place in democratic institutions, we find (either explicitly or implicitly) that there is an agenda setter or a formateur. Such players are uniquely able to make substantive proposals for given topics. Their statuses remain intact even after rejection of proposals, but they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003315163
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Positive- versus zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum games : an experimental study
Hsu, Li-chen; Yang, C. C.; Yang, Chun-lei - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 68 (2008) 3/4, pp. 498-510
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806840
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The agencies method for modeling coalitions and cooperation in games
Nash, John F. - In: International game theory review 10 (2008) 4, pp. 539-564
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866460
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Essays on bargaining and decision making
Hyndman, Kyle - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003972203
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Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140
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Proportional payoffs in majority games
Montero, María (contributor) - 2008
modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312