An important result in convex analysis is the duality between a closed convex set and its support function. We exploit this duality to develop a novel geometric approach to mechanism design. For a general class of social choice problems we characterize the feasible set, which is closed and...

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...

We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium...

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to investigate the nature of cooperation and punishment. Subjects are matched in a series of two-person, two-stage games with a sequential equilibrium that supports first-stage cooperation with a credible threat of subsequent punishment....

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo...