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A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733871
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous ‘disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009690
We report experimental data from bargaining situations where bargainers can make proposals as often and whenever they want, and can communicate via written messages. We vary the set of feasible contracts, thereby allowing us to assess the focality of three properties of bargaining outcomes:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012261
This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (1997). A distinguished player makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036720
This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997650
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion. Inequity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058085
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division in majoritarian bargaining games
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064488
It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081559