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Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining

Hart, Sergiu - In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, (pp. 305-319). 1985

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001260229

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

Gomes, Armando R.; Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - In: Games and economic behavior 27 (1999) 2, pp. 204-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001380522

Efficiency does not imply immediate agreement

Hart, Sergiu; Levy, Zohar - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 67 (1999) 4, pp. 909-912

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001390156

Efficiency does not imply immediate agreement: a reply to Hart and Levy

Gul, Faruk - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 67 (1999) 4, pp. 913-917

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001390159

A model of n-person non-cooperative bargaining

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000893817

Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010) 1, pp. 7-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008649319

Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field

Gomes, Armando R.; Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - 2004

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069012

Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field

Gomes, Armando R.; Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070389