The reactive bargaining set (Granot(1994)) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

This chapter focuses on the bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus. The theory of the bargaining set answers a more modest question: How would or should the players share the proceeds, given that a certain coalition structure (c.s.) has formed? From a normative point of view, the reason for...

Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeoff between secrecy and operational effciency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to determine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into account. In this paper this...

In order to be able to devise successful strategies for destabilizing terrorist organizations it is vital to recognize and understand their structural properties. This paper deals with the optimal communication structure of terrorist organizations when considering the tradeoff between secrecy...