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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013185348
Prior research on "strategic voting" has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003787573
We first observe that two of Maskin’s results do not extend beyond three players: we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique efficient solution for each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809530
A 2-round negotiation study provided evidence that positive feelings resulting from one negotiation can be economically rewarding in a second negotiation. Negotiators experiencing greater subjective value (SV) - that is, social, perceptual, and emotional outcomes from a negotiation - in Round 1...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948731
We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612886
game). One week later, the same individuals are invited to play those same games with monetary compensation. Finally in the …, the discrepancy between hypothetical and real behavior is larger in games where real choices have no strategic consequence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545257
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400892
We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383020
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445929
Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness does influence decision making. Fairness in the sense of equality has become an essential element of economic models aiming at explaining actual behavior (cf. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538681