Showing 1 - 5 of 5
This paper shows that any attempt to deviate from the basic bargaining line is doomed to fail. The Cournot attempt results in undistributed pie, while the Rubinstein-Binmore one in insufficient distribution. Discount rate may be important to bargaining, but game theorists have not been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015707
This paper proves that Rubinstein's bargaining theory is completely wrong. Using the Edgeworth box to solve the bargaining problem requires two pies. A reduced Edgeworth box may contain one pie, but it requires someone smarter than Ricardo to work out a common terms of trade. Rubinstein's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015708
Timing of payment occurs when production takes time, when both buyer and seller are subject to uncertainty during the production process and the eventual dispute afterward. While Cheng tries to work out a model to explain the timing problem, this paper points out that he has confused the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013965
This paper offers a historical account of the bargaining theories. It includes (i) the calculation methods for bargaining, (ii) the bargaining theories for benefit, and (iii) the bargaining theory against cost. This paper proves that economists cannot offer any satisfactory solution to these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131411
This paper develops a bargaining model based on Nash (1950). To get a larger share, a negotiator has to be wealthier, more patient, and/or to have lower negotiation cost. Sometimes, negotiation may end without an agreement, but the costly consequences will bring the parties back to negotiate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095248