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Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such … nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the Restricted Core for such … players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the Core, and contains the well-known Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046563
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338005
The Hart-and-Mas-Colell bargaining model [Hart and Mas-Colell (2010). “Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games.” Journal of the European Economics Association, 8, 7-33], which is based on strategic form games, is a very promising model possessing many beautiful features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066306
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327842
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The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242612
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972