When financial regulators require banks to hold a higher ratio of equity capital to debt funding, banks incur short-term costs as they adjust their balance sheets and lose some of the advantages associated with their existing funding mix. They then seek to maintain post-tax income by, for...

Based on a non-linear equilibrium model of the banking sector with an occasionally-binding equity issuance constraint, we show that the economic impact of changes in bank capital requirements depends on the state of the macro-financial environment. In ”normal” states where banks do not face...

Based on a non-linear equilibrium model of the banking sector with an occasionally-binding equity issuance constraint, we show that the economic impact of changes in bank capital requirements depends on the state of the macro-financial environment. In "normal" states where banks do not face...

We examine the period over which banking authorities discussed, adopted, and implemented Basel III to understand whether, when, and how firms respond to proposed regulation. We find evidence to suggest that the affected banks not only lobbied rule makers against it, but these banks also made...

We use a proprietary database of individual UK capital requirements spanning 1989 to 2013 and panel regression techniques to evaluate whether the effects of capital requirements on banks' balance sheet adjustments changed after the 2008–09 financial crisis. We find that after the crisis banks...

Based on a non-linear equilibrium model of the banking sector with an occasionally binding equity issuance constraint, we show that the economic impact of changes in bank capital requirements depends on the state of the macro-financial environment. In ”normal” states where banks do not face...

Based on a non-linear equilibrium model of the banking sector with an occasionally binding equity issuance constraint, we show that the economic impact of changes in bank capital requirements depends on the state of the macro-financial environment. In 'normal' states where banks do not face...

A fundamental cause of the global financial crisis was excessive creation of short-term money-like liabilities (quasi-money), notably in shadow banking holdings of sub-prime MBS and other US dollar structured credit instruments and in cross-border flow of capital to the uncompetitive Euro area...

A fundamental cause of the global financial crisis was excessive maturity mismatch, notably shadow banking holdings of sub-prime MBS and other structured credit instruments and cross-border Euro area interbank lending to the uncompetitive Euro area periphery. The costs of short term funding do...