We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. The bank is exposed to credit risk and may use credit default swaps (CDS) for hedging purposes. Regulation is found to induce...

The great financial turmoil that started 2007 has brought bank regulation back into the political debate. There is talk about imposing new regulations on banks and other financial intermediaries. Yet, we are not convinced that it is completely understood how the existing regulation affects...

So far the discussion in Switzerland about the social costs and benefits of higher capital requirements resulting from the new Basel III Accord and the Swiss Too Big To Fail legislation has been heavily qualitative. This paper provides a quantitative view and estimates the long-run costs and...

The goal of the Basle II regulatory formula is to model the unexpected loss on a loan portfolio. The regulatory formula is based on an asymptotic portfolio unexpected default rate estimation that is multiplied by an estimate of the loss given default parameter. This simplification leads to a...

The paper proposes an application of the survival time analysis methodology to estimations of the Loss Given Default (LGD) parameter. The main advantage of the survival analysis approach compared to classical regression methods is that it allows exploiting partial recovery data. The model is...

The paper proposes a new method to estimate correlation of account level Basle II Loss Given Default (LGD). The correlation determines the probability distribution of portfolio level LGD in the context of a copula model which is used to stress the LGD parameter as well as to estimate the LGD...

This study aims to analyse the sensitivity of capital requirements to changes in risk parameters (PD, LGD and M) by creating a model bank with a portfolio mirroring the average asset composition of internationally active large banks, as well as locally oriented smaller institutions participating...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the internal rating based approach. The paper considers how a bank's preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators. The model...

This paper simulates the minimum capital requirements for the wholesale exposures of a medium-sized bank in each EMU country depending on the credit rating agencies chosen by the bank to risk-weight its exposures in the standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II. Three main results emerge...