We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as...

This paper investigates whether European banks have capital targets and how deviations from the target impact their equity composition and activity mix. Using quarterly data for a sample of large European banks between 2004 and 2011, we show that there are notable asymmetries in banks' reactions...

We analyze the effect of negative monetary policy rates on banks, using detailed supervisory information from Switzerland. For identification, we compare changes in the behavior of banks that had different fractions of their central bank reserves exempt from negative rates. More affected banks...

Following the COVID shock, supervisors encouraged banks to use capital buffers to support the recovery. However, banks have been reluctant to do so. Provided the market expects a bank to rebuild its buffers, any draw-down will open up a capital shortfall that will weigh on its share price....

In November 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) issued a report analyzing the rapid expansion and growing risks of the stablecoin market. PWG’s report determined that stablecoins pose a wide range of potential hazards, including the risks of inflicting large losses...

The recent financial crisis highlighted the role of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in exacerbating the crisis and in transmitting monetary policy beyond the local economy to global markets. Yet, little is known about their behavior, as most models of banking typically focus on banks with a loan...

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...

We propose a quantitative model of lending standards with two reasons for inefficient credit: lenders' moral hazard from deposit insurance or government guarantees, and imperfect information about the persistence of asset price growth, which generates incorrect but rational beliefs in the...

In this paper, we design countercyclical capital buffer rules that perform robustly across a wide range of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. These rules offer valuable guidance for policymakers uncertain about the most appropriate model(s) for decision-making. Our results...