Basel II and III standards are a regulatory consequence following two major crises in systemic nature, the homegrown Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Basel I, despite high expectations and claims by the Basel Committee, failed to prevent the following financial...

This paper briefly discusses the impact of regulation on the financial industry, and more specifically the development and expectations of Basel III guidelines. Elements of the recent global financial crisis provide the background for such discussion, and the evolution of the work conducted by...

As reliance on excessively short-term wholesale funding has been one of the major causes for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, recent advances in global liquidity regulation try to curb the excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding without being clear on how such an approach will affect...

We document several effects of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) rule on dealers' financing and intermediation of securities. For identification, we exploit the fact that the US implementation is more stringent than that in foreign jurisdictions. In line with LCR incentives, US dealers reduce...

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2008-09 crisis. The LCR brings some financial stability benefits, including a significant...

We address a number of comparative issues relating to the performance of failure prediction models for small, private firms. We use two models provided by vendors, a model developed by the National Bank of Belgium, and the Altman Z-score model to investigate model power, the extent of...

The current standardized approach for assessing credit risk under Basel III depends on ratings assigned by credit rating agencies (CRAs). However, this approach presents three problems. First, the definitions of ratings used by CRAs to assess the likelihood of default and recovery rates are not...

Although Basel II fortified the first two pillars with market transparency enhancing Pillar III disclosures and encouraged the usage of major Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch as quasi governmental authorities to overcome asymmetric informational...

The application, or to be more precise, the misapplication of securitization in the mortgage market had fatal consequences for the financial sector worldwide. More over securitization techniques enabled single banks to reduce their individual risk while at the same time transferred greater risk...

We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisisprone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks' distress and default cause, such claims are...