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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599575
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Information and volatility
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of economic theory 158 (2015), pp. 427-465
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548854
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500622
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Informational robustness and solution concepts
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470627
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033
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First-price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 1, pp. 107-143
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738468
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Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 744-759
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793488
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Counterfactuals with latent information
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2019 - Revised February 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011977272
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Information and Volatility
Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938545
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267