We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible...

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces...

We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible...

For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general...

We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces...

For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general...

We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible...