We present an algorithm, based on a differential evolution MCMC method, for Bayesian inference in AR-GARCH models subject to an unknown number of structural breaks at unknown dates. Break dates are directly treated as parameters and the number of breaks is determined by the marginal likelihood...

Dynamic volatility and correlation models with fixed parameters are restrictive for time series subject to breaks. GARCH and DCC models with changing parameters are specified using the sticky infinite hidden Markov-chain framework. Estimation by Bayesian inference determines the adequate number...

Markov-switching models are usually specified under the assumption that all the parameters change when a regime switch occurs. Relaxing this hypothesis and being able to detect which parameters evolve over time is relevant for interpreting the changes in the dynamics of the series, for...

GARCH volatility models with fixed parameters are too restrictive for long time series due to breaks in the volatility process. Flexible alternatives are Markov-switching GARCH and change-point GARCH models. They require estimation by MCMC methods due to the path dependence problem. An unsolved...

Chapter written for the Handbook of Research Methods and Applications on Empirical Macroeconomics, edited by Nigar Hashimzade and Michael Thornton, forth- coming in 2012 (Edward Elgar Publishing). This chapter presents an introductory review of Bayesian methods for research in empirical...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

Within this framework of pure redistriubtion (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to...

This paper studies the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.