Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

This paper studies a new refinement for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). BEIC requires players to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical...

This note provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in a class of extended Bayesian persuasion models. We consider a framework in which a single sender discloses public information to n receivers. After observing the sender’s signal, the receivers update their beliefs to...

Finding a satisfactory way to represent individual decisions presents a challenge for economic models of social networks. I introduce a new solution concept, local Bayesian equilibrium, that allows us to capture strategic effects while gaining some of the tractability of simpler heurisitcs. The...