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Unawareness, beliefs and games
Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
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Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317
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Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Kets, Willemien - 2013
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099
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A cooperative value for Bayesian games
Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710
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Behavioral polymorphism in Bayesian games
Fabella, Raul V. - 2016
J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481671
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Refining Nash Equilibrium by Bayesian Iterative Conjectures Approach
Teng, Jimmy - 2012
process of conjectures formation and updating itself is a common knowledge. The BEIC is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100466
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Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 867-885
We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called TS correlation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673195
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A Bayesian Potential Game to Illustrate Heterogeneity in Cost/Benefit Characteristics
Palestini, Arsen - 2012
We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayesian game with finite type structures, taking into account the cost/benefit features of agents. Building on a standard model of oligopolistic competition also applicable to environmental issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103125
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Information independence and common knowledge
Gossner, Olivier; Kalai, Ehud; Weber, Robert James - 2009
(statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents’ types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective … that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873501
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Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728179