Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

This paper introduces two ideas, emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs), and evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Using a simple extensive form game, we illustrate the efficiency-enhancing role of a powerful ESDUC, the vengeance motive. Incorporating behavioral noise...

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....

In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global interaction effect reflecting a strategic substitutability in...

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995)...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

This study sets a bank-run equilibrium analysis in a dynamic and incomplete information environment where agents can reconsider attempts to run on the bank over time. The typical static bank-run model is extended in this paper to capture the learning dynamics of agents through time, giving...

In this paper, I provide a characterization of a \textit{set} of probability measures with which a prior ``weakly merges.'' In this regard, I introduce the concept of ``conditioning rules'' that represent the \textit{regularities% } of probability measures and define the ``eventual generation''...

A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only...