In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our 'hot' treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our 'cold' treatment we follow the 'strategy...

This paper presents data from experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a more complete...

This paper studies the universality of behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our "contribution function" design allows us to...

This chapter describes a sequence of four experiments. The hypotheses tested are all informed by one or more of the aforementioned types of models. Each experiment builds on the findings of the previous experiment in the sequence. At the same time, each experiment involves a different game,...