The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on own or others’ beliefs. It allows for incorporating, e.g., emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how...

Differences in cognitive sophistication and effort are at the root of behavioral heterogeneity in economics. To explain this heterogeneity, behavioral models assume that certain choices indicate higher cognitive effort. A fundamental problem with this approach is that observing a choice does not...

Behavioral heterogeneity arising from cognitive differences among economic agents plays a fundamental role in the economy. To explain this heterogeneity, models of iterative thinking assume that certain choices indicate higher cognitive effort. That is, choices are used to infer the cognitive...

This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...

We use a ‘multi-player dictator game' (MDG) with ‘social information' about the contribution decision about a previous dictator to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor') using a sequential...

We propose and experimentally test a theory of strategic behavior in which players are cognitively imprecise and perceive a fundamental parameter with noise. We focus on 2 x 2 coordination games, which generate multiple equilibria when perception is precise. When adding a small amount of...

We propose and experimentally test a theory of strategic behavior in which players are cognitively imprecise and perceive a fundamental parameter with noise. We focus on 2 x 2 coordination games, which generate multiple equilibria when perception is precise. When adding a small amount of...

This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...

We propose and experimentally test a theory of strategic behavior in which players are cognitively imprecise and perceive a fundamental parameter with noise. We focus on 2 x 2 coordination games, which generate multiple equilibria when perception is precise. When adding a small amount of...

Anticipating "social risk", or risk caused by humans, affects decision-making differently from anticipating natural risk. Drawing upon a large sample of the US population (n=3,982), we show that the phenomenon generalizes to risk experience. Experiencing adverse outcomes caused by another human...