In classical perfect and complete markets prices form a Martingale and stock returns (or equivalently, successive price changes) are serially uncorrelated. However, there is evidence that stock returns are serially correlated in both the short and the long-term; this has been construed as a...

In classical perfect and complete markets, prices form a Martingale and stock returns (or equivalently, successive price changes) are serially uncorrelated. However, there is considerable evidence in the finance literature showing that stock returns are serially correlated both in the short and...

We consider an optimal execution problem where an agent holds a position in an asset which must be liquidated (using limit orders) before a terminal horizon. Beginning with a standard model for the trading dynamics, we analyse how the acknowledgement of model misspecification affects the agent's...

This paper develops a tractable dynamic model of competition between two risk-averse portfolio managers who attempt to outperform each other by trading in different stocks, reflecting asset specialization. We characterize explicitly the unique Nash equilibrium portfolio policies, and show that a...

Interacting agents in finance represent a behavioral, agent-based approach in which financial markets are viewed as complex adaptive systems consisting of many boundedly rational agents interacting through simple heterogeneous investment strategies, constantly adapting their behavior in response...

We consider an investor faced with the utility maximization problem in which the risky asset price process has pure-jump dynamics affected by an unobservable continuous-time finite-state Markov chain, the intensity of which can also be controlled by actions of the investor. Using the classical...

This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic...