Open-end mutual funds can use redemption in kind to satisfy investor redemptions by delivering securities instead of cash. We find that funds that reserve their rightsto redeem in kind experience less redemption after poor performance. Evidence from actual in-kind transactions reveals several...

We find that capital flows to hedge funds in different countries are influenced by the strength and the enforcement of investor protection laws in these countries. Hedge funds that are located in weak investor protection countries exhibit a greater sensitivity of investor outflow to poor...

This paper introduces two measures to investigate potential window-dressing behavior among mutual fund managers. We show that unskilled managers that perform poorly are more likely to window dress by strategically purchasing winner stocks and selling loser stocks near quarter ends. Further,...

For funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than those during the rest of the year even after controlling for risk in both time-series and the cross-section; (ii) this December spike is greater...

Hedge fund flows chase alpha, yet they also follow returns attributable to traditional and exotic risk exposures. Investors appear more cognizant of exotic risks over time, with flows increasing their relative emphasis on returns from exotic betas in recent years. Investors also discriminate...

This paper develops two measures of performance inconsistency based on information derived from funds' actual performance and their disclosed portfolio holdings. Using these measures, we show that funds with unskilled managers and poor performance are associated with greater inconsistency....

We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...

We provide a rationale for window dressing where investors respond to conflicting signals of managerial ability inferred from a fund's performance and its disclosed portfolio holdings. We contend that window dressers take a risky bet on their performance during a reporting delay period, which...