We study three fundamental components of financial agency settings: Perception and communication of investment profiles, the interaction of agents’ and clients’ preferences, and the role of (non-)monetary incentives. The perception of investment profile terminology is very heterogeneous,...

Differences in management and shareholders priorities have been recognized and accepted to exist creating problems in the agency to which financial theorists opined that dividend payments is the best means of resolving the conflict. Results obtained using the multiple regression equation model...

Anecdotal evidence suggests that investor protection affects the demand for equity, but existing theories emphasize only the effect of investor protection on the supply of equity. We build a model showing that the demand for equity is important in explaining financial development. If the level...

Ackert and Deaves (2010) said that most people have tendency to being risk averse, but with appropriate amount of compensation, people may take more risk. Understanding those circumstances, this research trying to figure risk involved in a Mean-Variance Model. This model has taken consideration...

Performance evaluation of mutual funds using factor pricing models is usually distorted by the existence of a volatility anomaly and correlated residuals. By augmenting the Fama-French five-factor model with an active peer benchmark, we eliminate the measurement errors caused by these...

We study firm-level characteristics that a manager would employ as signalling tools in order to time the market (i.e. repurchases and issues). Following the market timing framework, we develop a two-factor asset pricing model comprising a “market” and a “mispricing” factor, which is able...

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic...

A typical hedge fund manager receives greater compensation when the fund has a strong absolute or relative performance. Asymmetric performance fees and fund flow-performance relationship may create incentives for risk-shifting, estimated in our study by the change in fund return volatility in...

I study how mutual funds invest in public U.S. firms where founding family members retain a significant portion of shares. I posit that informed funds exploit the opaque nature of family firms by holding large positions when they have good private signals about the firms. By studying actively...

Using close to 800,000 transactions by 66,000 households in the United States and close to 2,000,000 transactions by 303,000 households in Finland, this paper shows that individual investors with longer holding periods choose to hold less liquid stocks in their portfolios, consistent with Amihud...