In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand...

In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand...

This paper revisits the classic profit-ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and the issue of endogenous choice of strategic variables for product market competition, but for a network goods duopoly. It demonstrates that in the case of strong network externalities and imperfect-substitute...

We revisit the classic profit-ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and the issue of endogenous choice of a price or a quantity contract, but for a network goods duopoly. We show that, if network externalities are strong (weak), each firm earns higher (lower) profit under Bertrand...

This paper examines how strategic managerial delegation affects firms' timing of adoption of a new technology under different modes of product market competition. It demonstrates that delegation has differential impacts on adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Delegation with...