Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their...

Recent contributions have explored how lack of buyer mobility affects pricing. For example, Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) envisage a two-stage game where, once prices are set by the firms, the buyers play a static game by choosing independently which firm to visit. We incorporate imperfect...

Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their...