Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced … unemployment duration is positive and significant. Neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced … unemployment duration is positive and significant. Neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment … unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …

wage, unemployment, and non-employment structures between 1988 and 1998, when both unemployment and non-employment rates … moderation on average. Although there have also been virtually no changes in the unemployment structure, the relative non …

selective extension of the potential duration of unemployment benefits. If social interactions are important, this policy change … affects entitled individuals not only directly, but also indirectly by altering the duration of unemployment in the reference …

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

This study examines the determinants of job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program … the form of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) – so as to mitigate the moral hazard problem of traditional … unemployment insurance programs. Our study is the first one to empirically investigate whether UISAs improve work incentives. We …