Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the playersʼ strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the...

In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyze the possibility for learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework proposed by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a dynamic multiperiod setting where agents...

This paper studies the evolution of peoples' models of how other people think - their theories of mind. First, this is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

This paper studies the evolution of peoples' models of how other people think - their theories of mind. First, this is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

We report on an experiment exploring whether and how players may learn to use a random device to coordinate on a correlated equilibrium that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibria of a two-player Battle of the Sexes game. By contrast with other studies exploring recommendations and correlated...

We study strategic information transmission in an organization consisting of an infinite sequence of individual decision makers. Each decision maker chooses an action and receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects...