This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...

We consider a congested facility where agents can line up at any time they wish after the facility opens (like airplane boarding, or drivers leaving stadium parking lots after a sports event). We show that in Nash equilibrium, within the general family of stochastic queue disciplines with no...

We analyze the welfare effects of part-day teleworking on road traffic congestion in the context of Vickrey's dynamic bottleneck model. Endogenous decisions to become equipped with a teleworking-enabling technology change the scheduling of arrival times at work for equipped drivers and, due to...

We explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on acongested road network with heterogeneous users and allowing for elasticdemand. Heterogeneity is represented by a continuum of values of time. Thenetwork consists of both serial and parallel links, which allows us to...

This paper provides a link between car following theory and the economic theoryof road congestion by means of a theory of speed choice. According to this theory speedchoice is based on a trade-off between the benefits (shorter travel time) and cost (higheraccident risk) of driving faster....

This paper develops a continuous-time -continuous-place economic model of road trafficcongestion with a bottleneck, based on car-following theory. The model integrates twoarchetype congestion technologies used in the economics literature: 'static flow congestion',originating in the works of...

A dynamic 'car-following' extension of the conventional economic model of traffic congestion is presented, which predicts the average cost function for trips in stationary states to be significantly different from the conventional average cost function derived from the speed-flow function. When...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse proportional heterogeneity that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...