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We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions … implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. We … also provide a mechanism for implementation in BRD if the rule is quasimonotonic and excludes worst alternatives – no worst …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577250
Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876323
We study the implementation problem when players are prone to make mistakes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit … worst alternative are the necessary conditions for restricted Limit LQRE (LLQRE) implementation. Moreover, these conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603331
implementation with bounded depth of reasoning, discussing the role and implications of different behavioral anchors. The central …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721
Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD … agents. Extensions to incomplete information environments are also obtained. -- robust implementation ; bounded rationality … ; evolutionary dynamics ; mechanisms ; stochastic stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506456
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010846002
In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111035
This paper considers an implementation problem with bounded rationality of the agents. Bounded rationality presented … implementation, called k-secure implementation, which is double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and (n …) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) which is equivalent to n-secure implementability respectively …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838228
These notes review two simple heterogeneous agent models in economics and finance. The first is a cobweb model with rational versus naive agents introduced in Brock and Hommes (1997). The second is an asset pricing model with fundamentalists versus technical traders introduced in Brock and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343262