Showing 1 - 10 of 19
Given any observed finite sequence of prices, wealth, and demand choices, we propose a way to measure and classify the departures from rationality in a systematic fashion, by connecting violations of the underlying Slutsky matrix properties to the length of revealed demand cycles. The approach...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994625
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003577679
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003524007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003572588
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009373112
Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506456
Given any observed demand behavior by means of a demand function, we quantify by how much it departs from rationality. Using a recent elaboration of the "almost implies near" principle, the measure of the gap is the smallest norm of the correcting matrix that would yield a Slutsky matrix with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010241984
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
Given any observed finite sequence of prices, wealth and demand choices, we characterize the relation between its underlying Slutsky matrix norm (SMN) and some popular discrete revealed preference (RP) measures of departures from rationality, such as the Afriat index. We show that testing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472595
We consider mechanism design in contexts in which agents exhibit bounded depth of reasoning (level k ) instead of rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents are assumed to be truth tellers, level k agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401721