We analyze trade-offs in the organization of public safety networks when network assets are distributed across districts and a district values network assets in its own and other districts. Comparing centralized, decentralized, and mixed organization forms, we capture two critical properties:...

We study franchise arrangements that allow franchisees with exclusive territories to own their customers. This permits franchisees to benefit from positive externalities in the franchise network through interfranchise transfers based on the purchases by their customers at other franchises on the...

We employ the theory of incomplete contracts to examine the relationship between own­ership and investment in electronic networks such as the Internet and interorganiza­tional information systems. Electronic networks represent an institutional structure that has resulted from the introduction...

We propose a general and precise model of a network alliance that addresses both the role of membership and the role of incentives in the coordination of actions and interactions of network alliance members. Using examples in such disparate industries as professional engineering, accounting...