We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...

In this paper, we study a standard Cournot model where firms are able to form bilateral collaboration agreements which lower marginal cost. While a static analysis of such a model can be found in Goyal and Joshi [5], we introduce an evolutionary model. Stable networks (in the static sense)...

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project's quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the...

This paper studies the diffusion of products and behaviour with coordination effects through social networks when agents are myopic best responders. We develop a new network measure, the contagion threshold, that determines when a p-dominant action – an action that is a best response when...

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project's quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the...

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...

Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...

Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network...

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...