The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...

We study the incentives of oligopolistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then...

In this paper we analyze R&D collaboration networks in industries where firms are competitors in the product market. Firms' benefits from collaborations arise by sharing knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. By forming collaborations, however, firms also change their own competitive...

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to...

We present a model where firms engage in imperfect price competition, firms cannot sell to all consumers. A bipartite network structure models the local interaction of firms and consumers. We solve for the unique equilibrium of duopolistic price competition and study the implications of network...

Whereas in some industries retailers distribute the products of all suppliers, in other industries they differentiate themselves from their rivals by becoming the exclusive distributors of some products, which results in incomplete distribution networks. To study this phenomenon, I analyze a...

This paper examines the informativeness of consumer information networks and their effect on price competition between firms. Under the proposed information mechanism, consumers share their initial information with the members of their network and as such become better informed. The main result...