The B case discusses the project manager's decision to accept the contract and reveals his thinking in arriving at a …

"We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of limited … enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a … pricing aggregate risk. We find that for high values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, the limited enforcement …

, the optimal contract rewards Agent for taking specific risk of individual assets in excess of the systematic risk of the …) invests on behalf of an investor (Principal), who compensates the manager with an optimal contract. We extend a model from …

We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of limited … enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a … pricing aggregate risk. We find that for high values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, the limited enforcement …

We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of limited … enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a … pricing aggregate risk. We find that for high values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, the limited enforcement …