The likely impact of the EMU on the variability and level of employment is analysed. The major conclusions are: (1) Although an inflation-target regime will constrain monetary policy of a non-participant in the EMU, it still leaves considerable scope for exchange-rate changes in the case of...

We define and study transparency, credibilitym and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

The first section of this paper presents a model of the economy and poses the problem of optimal monetary policy. The second characterizes the responses of endogenous variables, including nominal interest rates, to shocks under an optimal regime, and highlights the advantages of commitment, by...

This paper discusses how price stability can be defined and how price stability can be maintained in practive. Some lessons for the Eurosystem are also considered.

We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency.

Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconometric model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit "instrument rules" as well as "targeting rules". The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to...

The paper extends previous analysis of closed-economy inflation targeting to a small open economy with forward-looking aggregate supply and demand with some microfoundations, and with stylized realistic lags in the different transmission channels for monetary policy. The paper compares targeting...

Previous analysis of the implementation of inflation targeting is extended to monetary policy responses to different shocks, consequences of model uncertainty, effects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization, a comparison with nominal GDP targeting, and implications of forward-looking...

Central banks have several reasons for extracting information from asset prices. Asset prices may embody more accurate and more up-to-date macroeconomic data than what is currently published or directly available to policy makers. Aberrations in some asset prices may indicate imperfections or...