We show that a private label is an indirect mean to contract on quality in a vertical structure, and is signed by a downstream firm only when its bargaining power is high. When its bargaining power decreases, sharing the fixed cost of quality in a private label with the upstream firm is not...

La concentration industrielle n'a cessé d'augmenter ces vingt dernières années. Cette concentration est présente autant chez les producteurs que chez les distributeurs. Par conséquent, analyser le pouvoir de marché est devenu primordial. La mesure du pouvoir de marché nécessite l'analyse...

This paper develops and estimates a structural model of imperfect competition in international markets. The model incorporates a flexible non-linear demand framework with structural price equations. A general conjonctural variation approach is developed to characterize strategic interaction....

We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly model where goods are horizontally and vertically differentiated. While locations are chosen under quality undertainty, firms choose prices and advertising expenditures being privately informed about their thpes. We show that pure price...

This paper derives optimal regulatory schemes for partially regulated multimarket utilities, both in a context of complete and asymmetric information. The effects of this optimal price structure regulation on competition in the unregulated segment are explored in a context of Cournot and...

The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex-post investigations. Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. Whe the precision of the Competition Authority's analysis is not high...

We present a methodology allowing to introduce manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market. We consider in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part...

In this paper, we analyze how the upstream Bertrand competition is distorted when we take into account repetition of the interactions within a vertical relationship. We argue that, in a two-period setting, a downstream monopsonist may prevent an efficient producer to prey on a less efficient...