We consider financial contracts that are tradeble in any quantities at fixed prices. A bundle of such contracts constitutes an arbitrage if it offers non-negative payiff in any future state, but commands negative present cost. This note brings together fairly recent results on how to find an...

This note deals with on-line computatin of learning of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. We account for the fact that the loss distribution often is unknown, unavailable, or intractable. Alternatively, the contracting parties could be inexperienced. In both cases losses must be simulated of...

Should the government procure equipment for its agencies or let them run their own procurement auctions? Suppose the agency has private information about product quality, but is inclined to favor local suppliers. Decentralization saves bureaucracy and "agency costs" (costs tied to truthful...

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort. If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing...