We present a self-consistent model for explosive financial bubbles, which combines a mean-reverting volatility process and a stochastic conditional return which reflects nonlinear positive feedbacks and continuous updates of the investors' beliefs and sentiments. The conditional expected returns...

Performance of investment managers are evaluated in comparison with benchmarks, such as financial indices. Due to the operational constraint that most professional databases do not track the change of constitution of benchmark portfolios, standard tests of performance suffer from the look-ahead...

We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors' perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund's fee-setting mechanism. The managers' true...

Using a recently introduced method to quantify the time varying lead-lag dependencies between pairs of economic time series (the thermal optimal path method), we test two fundamental tenets of the theory of fixed income: (i) the stock market variations and the yield changes should be...

Following Levy and Roll [2010], we posit that the market portfolio is the efficient tangent Markowitz portfolio, i.e., it is mean-variance efficient. We then reverse engineer the expected returns and variance terms with constraints imposed by empirical data on a hierarchy of asset baskets. This...

We investigate the distributions of e-drawdowns and e-drawups of the most liquid futures financial contracts of the world at time scales of 30 seconds. The e-drawdowns (resp. e-drawups) generalise the notion of runs of negative (resp. positive) returns so as to capture the risks to which...

We analyze a controlled price formation experiment in the laboratory that shows evidence for bubbles. We calibrate two models that demonstrate with high statistical significance that these laboratory bubbles have a tendency to grow faster than exponential due to positive feedback. We show that...