This Article attempts to define hedge funds and to distinguish them from a variety of similar investment funds. After reviewing the hedge fund definition in the U.S. and the EU, this Article argues that the current regulatory framework, which defines hedge funds by reference to what they are not...

Hedge fund managers are compensated via management fees on the assets under management (AUM) and incentive fees indexed to the high-water mark (HWM). We study the effects of managerial skills (alpha) and compensation on dynamic leverage choices and the valuation of fees and investors' payoffs....

Little is known about the exact sources and risks of hedge fund's market neutral strategies. Based on existing views on arbitrage trading, such as done by hedge funds, we formulate and test a hypothesis that market neutrality is affected by market-wide liquidity. We find that such is the case...

Consistent with the argument that portfolio disclosure reveals "trade secrets", a difference-in-differences estimation suggests that there is a drop in fund performance after a hedge fund begins filing Form 13F, as well as an increase in return correlations with other funds in the same...

This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter-end equity holdings are disclosed with a significant delay through amendments to the Form 13F. Our evidence supports hiding private information as the dominant motive for...

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits...