This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, this indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence...

Shareholder activism constitutes an increasingly prominent feature of corporate governance landscape. There is a controversy in prior research over whether and how much value activism creates. We examine whether estimates of the impact of shareholder activism are published selectively in prior...

This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In...

This paper proposes a theoretical model that incorporates corporate governance into the basic CAPM, where corporate governance affects the disutility of managerial effort and the possibility of managers to divert company resources. It shows that corporate governance affects firms’ stock...

This paper examines whether the quality of stock analysts' forecasts is related to conflicts of interest from their employers' investment banking (IB) and brokerage businesses. We consider four aspects of forecast quality: accuracy, bias, and revision frequency of quarterly earnings per share...

The forthright brand of shareholder activism hedge funds deploy became during the 2000s a significant feature of Canadian corporate governance. This paper examines hedge fund activism “Canadian style.” The paper characterizes the interventions hedge funds specialize in as “offensive”...

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance systems on insiders' ability to profit from their information advantage and the ways through which corporate governance systems influence such ability. We find that corporate governance significantly reduces the profitability of insider...

Notwithstanding the focus on hedge fund activism, fundamental questions remain. How much does hedge fund activism really matter? What has academic study contributed to the understanding of hedge fund activism? And what, if anything, does research on hedge fund activism illuminate about the...

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits...

Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? Good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The output of quality accounting...