Prior research has often taken the view that entrenched managers tend to avoid debt. Contrary to this view, we find that firms with entrenched managers, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index, use more debt finance and have higher leverage ratios. To address the potential...

This study examines the effects of oligarch ownership on corporate capital structures. Using panel data from Ukraine, I find that oligarch-owned companies employ significantly more debt and liabilities than their peers. However, there is no direct relation between oligarch ownership and target...

This paper uses the BEEPS firm-level data to study the process of convergence of transition countries with developed market economies. The primary focus of the study is on competition and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to firms, and how firms respond to the economic...

This paper uses the BEEPS firm-level data to study the process of convergence of transition countries with developed market economies. The primary focus of the study is on competition and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to firms, and how firms respond to the economic...

This paper presents a rationale for hybrid public-private capital structures in public utilities. The public sector can borrow money cheaper, while private investors can spawn life-cycle cost savings. When investment vehicles enable the internalization of the financial advantage of the public...

Many scholars have linked Corporate Governance (CG) and performance or CG, capital structure of banks or market structure. The decision to use the capital market or debt in order to obtain the necessary capital to finance firms' operations is a critical factor for the formulation of corporate...

For a large sample of 48 countries, we find robust evidence that strong creditor rights are associated with low long-term leverage across countries. We further find that strong creditor protection lowers long-term debt issuance, the extent to which investments are financed with long-term debt,...

We find that an increase in a firm's incentives to use trade secrets to protect its intellectual property results in a more actively managed capital structure. Exploiting U.S. states' adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a positive “shock” in the protection afforded to trade secrets,...

When larger market values of equity result in being subject to costly regulation, firms have incentives to shift their sources of financing toward debt and away from equity. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a setting to provide evidence of such incentives. Smaller firms were...