Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,419
Cover Image
bidding rings
Asker, John - Palgrave Macmillan
A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395646
Cover Image
Auction design in the presence of collusion
Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429
colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700241
Cover Image
Collusion and the choice of auction : an experimental study
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2013
We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382492
Cover Image
Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
Cover Image
Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van - 2018
decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
Cover Image
Do pay-as-bid auctions favor collusion? : evidence from Germany’s market for reserve power
Heim, Sven; Goetz, Georg - 2013
behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751726
Cover Image
Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro’i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
Cover Image
Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions
Hendricks, Ken; Porter, Robert H. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2073-2143). 2007
We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues. We describe some basic concepts, to highlight some strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024584
Cover Image
Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
Cover Image
Collusion With a Rent-Seeking Agency in Sponsored Search Auctions
Lorenzon, Emmanuel - 2022
We study the implications of delegating bids to a bidding agency for the revenues and efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price auction, the standard sales mechanism for allocating online ad space. The agency maximizes both its own profits and the advertisers' surplus and implements collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307805