In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

Algorithmic collusion is a hot topic within antitrust circles in Europe, US and beyond. But some economists downplay algorithmic collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. This paper responds to these criticisms by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular...

This paper undertakes a critical review of the prospect that self-learning pricing algorithms will lead to widespread collusion independently of the intervention and participation of humans. There is no concrete evidence, no example yet, and no antitrust case that self-learning pricing...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...

Cartels and horizontal mergers can be viewed as alternative arrangements to increase profitability and act as means of introducing horizontal restraint. The choice between the two forms from the perspective of firms is determined by the structure of industry, organization of firms, and the...

In this paper, we analyze the question of membership in a non-renewable resource cartel, with specific application to OPEC. One would expect the benefits of cartel membership to be positively related to the size of remaining reserves, while domestic petroleum consumption should be negatively...

Successful upstream collusion must satisfy both the incentive constraint (keeping cartel members in line) and the compensation constraint (preventing lawsuits from downstream firms). Our analysis shows that there is a non-monotonic and inverted U-shaped relationship between cartel incidence and...

In this paper, we analyze the question of membership in a non-renewable resource cartel, with specific application to OPEC. Using a simple model of a non-renewable resource market, we show that the benefits of cartel membership are related to the size of remaining reserves. Domestic petroleum...