The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. Several recent publications have suggested that the recent fines imposed by the European Commission are too low to be dissuasive and should therefore be substantially...

Deterring the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of antitrust policy. We develop a dynamic framework to characterize the compensation and deterrence properties of fines, based on the fact that cartel stability depends on the ability to prevent deviation, which itself...

Connor and Lande (2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010) finds a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data that are used in those studies are estimates that are obtained from...

Corrigendum to “Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union.” The paper “Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union” can be found at 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342180' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342180

Prosecution of the retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in Québec was the largest and most successful criminal investigation in the history of the Competition Bureau of Canada. In June 2008 the first charges were brought against 38 individuals and 14 companies under Section 45 of the pre-2010...

We analyze challenges and pitfalls faced by antitrust authorities in the fining of cartels. We review economics and legal approaches to cartel fining and the sometimes-conflicting objectives of restitution, deterrence, and proportionality. We also discuss various theoretical and empirical...