In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...

Antitrust and competition law have grown dramatically in importance and significance over the last fifty years. US antitrust law has been the principal source of inspiration for jurisdictions wishing to introduce regulation to control cartels and monopolization, and antitrust regulation has now...

A recent literature review conducted by the World Bank provides evidence that there are significant gains from combating cartels for developing countries (Kitzmuller and Martinez Licetti, 2012). Besides increasing the cost of goods and services, cartels are associated with low labor productivity...

This study aims at evaluating the causal effect of belonging to a cartel on firms’ profits. Using a dataset of discovered cartel cases in Spain (1990 -2014) and a dataset of firms’ balance sheets, a treatment and a control group can be distinguished. After constructing a sample of comparable...

In recent years, South African competition authorities have initiated a number of price-fixing cases in markets where cooperation among competitors was legal and often encouraged. These markets present economists with special difficulties when estimating cartel overcharges. Conventional...

Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the...

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure...

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term,...