We study optimal cartel prices in a two-sided market. We present a simple model showing that prices above the two-sided monopoly price may prevail on one side of a two-sided market as a means to enhance the sustainability of the cartel. We prove that in such a case a higher benefit from the...

Practices and conducts in professional and even amateur sports can be subject to competition laws as soon as commercial activities are involved. From an economic perspective, this implies that both directly commercial activities like the sale of broadcasting/media rights and indirectly...

Antitrust laws prohibit private firms to coordinate their market behavior, yet many types of interfirm cooperation are legal. Using laboratory experiments, we study spillovers from legal cooperation in one market to non-competitive prices in a different market. Our theoretical framework predicts...

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain loyal. If firms interact only once, if products are homogenous, if firms compete in price, and if marginal cost is constant, theory even predicts that strategic interaction...

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with...

In spite of the sharp decline of crude oil prices since the fall of 2008, the current price level of approximately $65 per barrel is significantly higher than the long-term average. The market power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which is partially responsible for...

Trotz des starken Rückgangs der Rohölpreise seit dem Herbst 2008 ist das Preisniveau mit gegenwärtig rund 60 US-Dollar pro Fass immer noch deutlich höher als im langfristigen Durchschnitt. Die Marktmacht der Organisation erdölexportierender Länder (OPEC) ist nach wie vor sehr groß und...

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with...

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

Surveys of antitrust cases reveal that colluding firms usually (1) attempt to minimise the risk of prosecution, (2) achieve merely imperfect levels of collusion, (3) compete against some independently acting firms, and (4) adjust to market entries and exits. In contrast, existing oligopoly...