stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors … cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care … the asymmetries in the non cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion. …

investigate the impact of customer-specific information on the likelihood of tacit collusion in a dynamic game of repeated … result is that collusion becomes more difficult as the firms' ability to segment consumers improves …

-disclosure relation is diminished when tacit collusion is less feasible (industries with many firms, variable demand, and variable cost …

first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in … an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always … sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the …

lowering the prices they offer to customers. These mechanisms create much greater scope for collusion than economic models … unconcentrated the industry becomes. In some instances, lower market concentration makes collusion easier; smaller firms may be more … dependent on collaboration with rivals and thus may be easier to punish if they undercut collusion. These results run directly …

an ordering among alternative behavioral hypotheses (Cournot, Stackelberg, Edgeworth/Bertrand, collusion, and perfect …